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SANTA CLARA LAWYER
respects, but who negligently allowed his license to lapse, was denied
compensation because of such lapse. The judicial interpretation of
section 7031 appears reasonable and just, and future litigants may
expect that the courts will continue to find substantial compliance
in fact situations similar to Latipac, where the previously mentioned
elements are present. However, it is evident that the Legislature
has persisted in wording sections 7031 and 7068.1 in such a manner
that they bespeak strict compliance. The analysis of the problem
presented in Latipac leads to the conclusion that some legislative
action should be taken to clarify and perhaps revise sections 7031
and 7068.1 in accordance with current judicial interpretation.
Paul E. Principe
THE "MERE EVIDENCE" RULE IN
CALIFORNIA: PEOPLE V. THAYER
(CAL. 1966)
The recent California Supreme Court decision of People v.
Thayer' affirms California law2 describing the scope of evidence
seizable under a valid search warrant. The decision appears, how-
ever, to be in conflict with constitutional limitations promulgated
under the federal "Mere Evidence" Rule.
FACTS
Defendant physician Thayer and his office assistant Magruder
were convicted of violating the California Penal Code' by submitting
false and fraudulent claims to the Bureau of Public Assistance. For
each patient receiving aid from the county, there was submitted a
medical care statement which certified services performed and
amounts due. At trial prosecution sought to prove that the bureau
1 63 Cal. 2d 635, 408 P.2d 108, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1966).
2 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524 provides in part, "A search warrant may be issued
upon any of the following grounds: . . . 2. When the property or things were used
as the means of committing a felony. . . . 4. When the property or things to be
seized .. . constitutes any evidence which tends to show a felony has been com-
mitted, or tends to show that a particular person has committed a felony." Although
the majority of the states limit by statute the permissible scope of searches so as to
exclude mere evidence, New York amended its search warrant statute (N.Y. Calm.
PRoc. § 792) in 1962 to include property constituting evidence of a crime.
3 CAL. PENAL CODE § 72 provides that "Every person who, with intent to de-
fraud, presents for allowance or for payment to any state board or officer . . .,
authorized to allow or pay the same if genuine, any false or fraudulent claim, bill,
account, voucher or writing, is guilty of a felony."
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was billed for services never performed and for services also billed
to others. Prosecution introduced into evidence the fraudulent medi-
cal care statements mailed to the bureau and corresponding non-
matching records reflecting actual medical care4 taken from Thayer's
files under a search warrant. Defendants unsuccessfully argued
that this was an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of
their privilege against self-incrimination under the fourth, fifth, and
fourteenth amendments and that the records could not be seized
under a warrant because they were merely evidence of crime and
not contraband, instruments of crime, or fruits of crime.
"MERE EVIDENCE" RULE
The "Mere Evidence" Rule states that objects of evidentiary
value only may not be seized by federal officers in the execution of
a search, and when such subjects are seized, they must be suppressed
as evidence.' The relatively new federal doctrine excluding evidence
seized in violation of the search and seizure laws, relied upon by Dr.
Thayer, was promulgated in Boyd v. United States.' The "Mere Evi-
dence" Rule, as expounded in Gouled v. United States, was sub-
stantially derived from Boyd and defines one ramification of what
is "excludable evidence" in federal courts. Gouled held that mere
evidence as distinguished from contraband, instruments of crime, or
fruits of a crime' could not be seized under a search warrant on both
constitutional' and evidentiary grounds.
Mere evidence has come to mean a man's correspondence, the
record of his business and his private papers and writings. The fed-
eral courts have undergone considerable struggle to winnow out
which books and records are mere evidence and which are instru-
4 People v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d at 636, 408 P.2d at 109, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
Defendants' employees testified that they used the seized records in preparing the
fraudulent statements and that they were instructed to show at least four visits on
each statement whether or not there had been that many.
5 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 312 (1921).
6 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The Supreme Court reversed a trial court ruling com-
pelling a defendant to produce a self-incriminating invoice pursuant to a statute.
The court stated that even though there was no search, "compulsory production of
private books and papers . . . is equivalent of a search and seizure, and an unreason-
able search and seizure, within the meaning of the fourth amendment."
7 255 U.S. at 308, describing the following as under these categories: "stolen
or forfeited property, or property liable for duties and concealed to avoid pay-
ment . . . , excisable articles and books required by law to be kept with respect to
them, counterfeit coin, burglars' tools and weapons, implements of gambling . ...
8 Id. at 304, but note that no constitutional language is cited.
9 For a complete coverage of the various applications of the Gouled rule, see
Note, Limitations on Seizure of "Evidentiary Objects"-A Rule in Search of Reason,
20 U. C. L. REV. 319 (1952-53).
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mentalities of a crime, 1° an exception to the rule." The rule does
not apply to records and related memoranda which are required by
law to be kept.12 If this were applicable under a California statute,
the prosecution's burden of proof would have been eased consider-
ably in Thayer. The rule has not been entirely limited to private
papers and records 8 but has been extended to include other evi-
dentiary matters. 4
The original distinction of evidentiary as opposed to non-evi-
dentiary material was based upon property rights. Objects in which
no legal property interests inhere (e.g., a counterfeiter's plates or abackwoodsman's moonshine liquor) are subject to search and sei-
zure. 5 On the other hand, those chattels in which a vested property
right exists (as in Dr. Thayer's case, private records) may neitherbe searched for nor seized.' 6 The distinction loses its clarity on aborderline item such as an assassin's rifle. Common law resolved theproblem by saying it was forfeited to the king. 7 This underlying
common law emphasis of the sanctity of property interests has
either shifted to personal rights which are the real basis for the ex-
clusionary rules of evidence or has been disregarded altogether.,'
Chief Justice Traynor admits that Dr. Thayer's records would
fall under the instrumentality exception to the "Mere Evidence"
Rule but shuns this rationale as "anacronistic" saying that it "gives
rise to technical rules that are entirely unrelated to the real issues of
10 United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1926) where defendant
sought to suppress certain ledgers and bills concerned with the operation of an un-lawful liquor business and the court held that they were instrumentalities used in
committing the offense; accord, Sayers v. United States, 2 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1924)(liquor and record of savings and beer purchases); United States v. Boyette, 229F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1962) (earnings records of prostitutes); United States v. Ra-banowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (altered draft cards). Contra, Bushouse v. United States,67 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1933) and United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1930),
where records related to the operation of an unlawful liquor business were held to
be purely evidentiary.
11 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
12 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
18 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. at 309, where it was stated, "There is
no special sanctity in papers, as distinguished from other forms of property, to render
them immune from search and seizure . .. ."
14 Morrison v. United States, 262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958), where defendant
was charged with committing a perverted act with a young boy and the prosecu-tion's evidence of a handkerchief which allegedly bore some tangible evidence of the
offense was suppressed as merely evidentiary.
15 Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946).16 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 622.
17 1 B.ACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES § 300-02 (21st ed. 1857), which states that
any personal chattel which, having moved ad mortem or been the immediate cause
of death of any reasonable creature, was forfeited to the king for pious uses. Later
this principle was extended to all chattels employed in an offense against the king.18 People v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d at 638, 408 P.2d at 109, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
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individual privacy and law enforcement that are involved." 9 This
view is heartily supported by the writers.2 ° In balancing the two
conflicting policies of privacy and effective law enforcement, the
later seems to control. Dr. Thayer's records cannot be favorably
compared to a personal diary or other similarly private writing since
they were used daily by the office assistant Magruder and were com-
mon knowledge to the other office employees. The records were
actually part of the means of committing the crime and it could be
argued that they were quasi-public in that taxpayers subsidized a
large portion of Dr. Thayer's business. Shapiro v. United States2'
held that records are seizable when there is a "sufficient relation
between the activity sought to be regulated and the public con-
cern." 22 It is submitted that there is such a sufficient relation in
Thayer.
In a given factual situation incident to a search and seizure,
the forth and fifth amendments to the federal Constitution may
apply. Boyd asserts that both amendments buttress the "Mere Evi-
dence" Rule 28 which Dr. Thayer relies upon. However, the search
and seizure involved here does not appear to violate the fourth or
fifth amendments.
The fourth amendment provides for "The right of the peo-
ple to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures."
24
The search for and seizure of Thayer's records was deemed rea-
sonable because conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant spe-
cifically describing the items to be seized and because there existed
probable cause to justify its issuance. When these requirements are
met, "it is impossible to understand why the admissibility of seized
items should depend upon whether they are merely evidentiary or
evidentiary plus something else."2
The fifth amendment declares that "no person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."26
Chief Justice Traynor rebuts the Gouled holding that the seizure
of writings of evidentiary value only violates the fifth amendment.
19 Ibid.
20 Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49 CAi".
L. REv. 474, 477-79 (1961) ; Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the 50 States, 1962
DUxE L.J. 319, 330 (1962), where Traynor predicted that he would overrule the
"Mere Evidence" Rule if it came before him; 8 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2184a (Mc-
Naughton rev. ed. 1961).
21 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
22 Id. at 32.
28 116 U.S. at 630.
24 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (Emphasis added.)
25 People v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d at 637, 408 P.2d at 109, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
26 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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He states, (1) the "Mere Evidence" Rule "is not limited to self-
incriminating writings,"2 7 (2) "the papers are no less self -incriminat-
ing when they can be classified as contraband, instruments of crime,
or fruits of crime,"" and (3) "when such writings are obtained by
seizure, instead of subpoena, the defendant does not impliedly admit
their genuineness."2 9 It would be illogical to allow Thayer's records
to be immune from seizure on the sole supporting crutch of the
"Mere Evidence" Rule's doubtful claim of substantiation by the
fifth amendment. The records are certainly incriminating, but it is
submitted that the Shapiro public records exception to the fifth
amendment controls. This is not to say that some areas (e.g., pri-
vate writings and diaries) which incidently qualify as mere evi-
dence would not also be considered self-incriminating under the
fifth amendment.
Thayer goes further by holding that these misapplications of
the "Mere Evidence" Rule to the amendments are also coupled with
the United States Supreme Court's tendency not to treat the rule
as a fundamental constitutional standard.8" The rule has been
severely limited by the decisions based upon the instrumentality ex-
ception. 8 No specific constitutional language has ever been proffered
to support the rule.82
FEDERAL INTERVENTION
Until recently, how Thayer would stand under the pressure of
Mapp v. Ohio" if considered as a constitutional standard, was an
open question. Prior to Mapp there was no difficulty for each state
applied its own exclusionary standards and the general rule was
that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and federal case law
were based upon the supervisory power of the United States Su-
preme Court over the administration of justice in federal courts and
not binding upon the states. So the "Mere Evidence" Rule did not
apply to the states.84 The Mapp holding changed significantly the
role of the United States Supreme Court by saying that all evidence
obtained by seizures in violation of constitutional standards is, by
that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.8 5 Ker v. Cali-
27 People v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d at 638, 408 P.2d at 110, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
80 Id. at 640, 408 P.2d at 111, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 783.
81 Ibid.
82 Id. at 639, 408 P.2d at 110, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
38 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
84 Ker. v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963).
85 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 660.
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fornia8" modified this holding by saying that the states must comply
with the general standards of reasonableness in a search and seizure
as set forth in Mapp, but that this reasonableness is a substantive
determination to be made by the trial court "from the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case and in the light of the 'fundamental criteria'
laid down by the Fourth Amendment and in the opinions of this
court in applying that Amendment." 7 Allowing the states this dis-
cretion in addition to the very limited application of the "Mere
Evidence" Rule by the federal courts in the first instance makes it
highly unlikely that this and other meandering procedural and evi-
dentiary views8" of the federal courts will be applied to the states.
CONCLUSION
California will not be coerced into accepting the "Mere Evi-
dence" Rule as one of these fundamental criteria established by the
United States Supreme Court and bottomed in the constitutional
amendments. The rule, based upon common law distinctions, is
inaccurate and too broad to demand sanctification in totum under the
Constitution or to require uniform application by the states as is now
generally required of obscenity and confession standards.
But Thayer must not be construed as destroying all possible
applications of the "Mere Evidence" Rule under different legal
classifications, including the rights of privacy and individual liberty.
Certainly a California statute prohibiting the use of a certain type
of birth control device for valid health reasons and allowing state
officials to enforce this law by a detailed plan for search and seizure
of evidentiary matters in the sanctuary of the marital bedroom
would never stand as admissible. Neither would a statute stand
86 374 U.S. at 23. Although Ker is based upon statutory interpretation it ap-
pears to be the Court's general rationale for this area. A later case, Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108 (1964), emphasized that the states must submit to the Court in deny-
ing that a magistrate can merely affirm a police officer's suspicions when issuing
a warrant. This was a weak case because the action of the judge was obviously
outside the state's latitude of reasonableness.
87 Id. at 31-35.
85 Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the 50 States, 1962 DuKE L.J. 319, 329
(1962), stated, "Even were they a well-developed nucleus, federal rules differentiating
the unreasonable from the reasonable in the searches and seizures of federal officials
might prove inappropriate on the local scene. It would be all the more inappropriate
to apply indiscriminately to the local scene the present conflicting federal rules, many
of which are underdeveloped or over-refined. It is idle to seek in the conglomeration
a pattern of consistent interpretation of the fourth amendment. It is not just that
the cases are conflicting. They are turbid with the wash of the fourth amendment
itself, of statutes specifying their authority to arrest, of the Supreme Court's monitor-
ship of the federal administration of criminal justice. Who can tell with certainty
why a search or seizure was held unreasonable? . ..Where is the lead that state
courts can follow?"
1966]
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which authorized a search and seizure for evidence of a membership
list of a lawful group of individuals who associate themselves to
achieve lawful ends but wish to keep their membership private.
The "Mere Evidence" Rule is a tired rule and its prohibitions
are overly wide in scope. But Chief Justice Traynor abrogated only
the old rationale of the doctrine and its obstructions to the state's
interpretation of the fourth amendment under the appropriate con-
stitutional guidelines. A generous portion of the "Mere Evidence"
Rule still stands but under different labels.
Robert B. Yonts, Jr.
